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RELIEF FOR THE NEGLECTED CHILD: COURT-
ORDERED MEDICAL TREATMENT IN NON-
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
Marie, age 14, suffers from an adenoid disorder. Her ade-
noids, which would ordinarily be absent at her age, are abnor-
mally enlarged. They produce a constant nasal blockage and
cause occasional fluid buildup behind her eardrums. She ex-
periences mild discomfort and complains that she has diffi-
culty hearing the teacher at school. She also has developed a
rather dull facial appearance common to a child with pro-
longed adenoid enlargement. Her condition, however, poses no
serious risk of immediate harm to her general health.
Marie comes from a single parent home. When the school
nurse suggested to her mother that an operation similar to a
simple tonsillectomy would relieve Marie of her discomfort,
reduce the risk of a serious ear infection, and probably im-
prove her daughter's performance in school, her mother re-
fused to consent to what she considered unnecessary surgery.
She said that Marie had no trouble hearing her mother at
home and that her daughter was just a little slow outgrowing
her adenoid phase. As long as the disorder posed no serious
risk of harm to her child's health, she preferred to allow the
condition to heal itself. Can Marie's mother be compelled over
her objections to provide her daughter with a non-emergency
adenoidectomy?
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of parents to raise their children as they think
best is a fundamental one. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that in the realm of family life parents have a
constitutionally protected right to act with autonomy.' They
o 1982 by Brian Hawes
1. The United States Supreme Court has articulated the concept of personal
liberty found in the fourteenth amendment as a right of privacy. This right extends
to a number of aspects of family life. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (quali-
fied right to terminate pregnancy); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (pa-
rental right to guide the religious future of their children); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (right to obtain contraceptives); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
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may raise their children according to the dictates of their own
consciences, individual beliefs, preferences, and life styles.2
This includes the right to decide what medical care a child
should or should not receive.3
Parental autonomy, however, is not absolute. The state,
as parens patriae, is the ultimate protector of the rights of its
citizen children." It acts to provide for their proper health,
welfare, and safety when parents fail in their natural function.
In most jurisdictions, statutes have been enacted to im-
pose a duty upon parents to provide their children with that
which is necessary for their proper health and welfare. Under
these statutes the court can compel parents to provide their
children with proper food, clothing, shelter, education, and
medical care.8 If through ignorance, prejudice, or neglect, par-
ents will not or cannot provide life's necessities, the court will
intervene on behalf of a child to safeguard his physical and
emotional well-being.
The purpose of this comment is to determine when the
court is justified to intervene and order non-emergency' medi-
cal treatment for a child over the objections of his parents.
First, the factors courts have historically considered will be
examined. These courts were primarily concerned with
whether parents have a duty to provide medical care and, if
so, what effect their failure to provide medical care would
have on the child's future. Second, the courts' analyses in re-
565 (1969) (right of privacy extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (right to marital privacy); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to marriage and procreation); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (liberty of parents to direct educa-
tion of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (liberty of par-
ents to educate child). See also Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifica-
tions and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1383-85 (1974).
2. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
3. Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 P. 345 (1911).
4. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); see Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). But see Note, supra note 1, at 1391-92 (suggests that the
doctrine of parens partriae as an analytical tool is being discarded in favor of more
substantive doctrines, such as procedural due process).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 26-28.
6. Emergency medical care is care, the absence of which results (or would re-
sult) in a substantial likelihood of death or grave physical harm. Non-emergency
medical care is care, the absence of which would not result in a substantial likelihood
of death. A condition requiring non-emergency medical attention would pose no im-
mediate threat to the life of the patient.
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cent decisions will be examined. These courts have recognized
that an evaluation of what would best serve the child's inter-
ests involves a number of subjective as well as objective con-
siderations, one of which may be the child's potential to live a
useful, fulfilled life. Finally, a recommended approach will be
offered to determine when the court should intervene to pro-
vide non-emergency medical care to a child.
II. FACTORS COURTS HAVE HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING WHETHER TO ORDER TREATMENT
Under common law the state has no privilege to remove a
child from the custody of its parents in order to provide it
with medical care. Although parents have a common law duty
to provide their children with the necessities of life,8 courts do
not necessarily have the power at common law to order par-
ents to provide their children with specific medical or surgical
treatment. 9 In many jurisdictions, this common law principle
has been mitigated by statute. Under civil child neglect stat-
utes, courts have been empowered to take custody e of a child
where he is found "neglected" or "dependent" or where par-
ents fail to provide their children with the "necessities of
life."11
A. The Applicable Statute
1. Court interpretation when specific language is
absent
When there is no specific language in the statute impos-
ing a duty upon parents to provide their children with medi-
cal attention, courts have differed over whether parents have
7. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); see In re Rotkowitz, 175
Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1941).
8. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); Greenspan v. Slate, 22
N.J. 344, 92 A.2d 47 (1952).
9. In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 949, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (1941). See Note,
Court Ordered Non-Emergency Medical Care for Infants, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv.
296, 297-98 (1969).
10. Normally the court will not remove the child from the parents' custody if
the parents are reasonably cooperative. The court may require the parents to admit
their child to a hospital or other facility so that the child may receive treatment or
therapy. It may also require the parents to permit authorized visits by personnel from
the state office of social services. In some cases, the court may retain jurisdiction and
conduct periodic hearings to determine whether the parents are cooperating.
11. See infra text accompanying note 28.
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such a duty under the statute. This problem arose in In re
Hudson12 where the Washington Supreme Court interpreted
the Washington child neglect statute. The statute provided
that a "dependent child" is "any child under the age of eigh-
teen years who is destitute . . .or whose parent does not
properly provide for such child.""8
The Hudson case involved an eleven-year old girl, Patri-
cia, who suffered from a congenitally deformed left arm which
was almost ten times its normal weight. After an adult sister
complained to the juvenile court that Patricia was in need of
medical care, the court ordered an examination. Doctors
agreed that amputation of the enormously heavy and useless
extremity was necessary in order for the girl to resume a nor-
mal life. Even though the procedure did involve a fair degree
of risk to her life, all concerned, including the girl, desired the
operation. Her mother, however, preferred to wait until Patri-
cia reached an age at which the mother could feel that the
child had made her own decision."'
The court found that although the parents had acted irre-
sponsibly toward their child, 5 they were not neglectful under
the statute. The statutory duty imposed upon them to provide
for their child did not specifically include the duty to furnish
12. 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
13. The Washington Juvenile Court Law (1913 Wash. Laws ch. 160, § 1) read in
pertinent part:
[T]he words "dependent child" shall mean any child under the age of
eighteen years:
(6) Who is destitute; or
(7) Whose home by reason of neglect ...of its parents or either of
them ...is an unfit place for such child; or
(13) Whose father, mother, guardian, or custodian. . . do not properly
provide for such child, and it appears that such child is destitute of a
suitable home . . . or where such child is without proper means of
support.
(18) all delinquent and dependent children within the state, shall be
considered wards of this state and their persons shall be subject to the
custody, care, guardianship and control of the courts as hereinafter
provided.
14. 13 Wash. 2d at 675-77, 126 P.2d at 767-68.
15. Id. at 677, 717, 126 P.2d at 768, 785. The mother had employed a "Divine
Healer" who had treated the child by prayer alone for four years, and the father was
a passive invalid who did.not wish to become involved in the controversy.
[Vol. 22
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medical care. 6 Therefore, the court could not find that Patri-
cia was a "dependent" within the meaning of the statute or
declare her a ward of the state for the purpose of compelling
her treatment. 17
The dissent argued that medical services are necessities
to be provided by parents"5 and that a child who is not fur-
nished such services is destitute within the meaning of the
statute.' Therefore, the dissent asserted that Patricia was a
"dependent" and that the juvenile court possessed the power
to order the required surgical procedure for her. 0
In In re Frank,2" a case involving the same statute, the
grandmother of a child who suffered from a speech impedi-
ment sought custody of the child because the child's father
refused to provide proper medical care.2 2 Again the court con-
cluded that the Washington child neglect statute does not
contain any provision requiring parents to furnish medical or
surgical care.23 Thus, the child was not a "dependent" under
the statute, and the court had no jurisdiction to deprive the
father of custody.
Other courts have read the child neglect statutes more
broadly. In Mitchell v. Davis24 the Texas Court of Civil Ap-
peals refused to narrowly construe a Texas child neglect stat-
ute. The statute defined a dependent or neglected child as
"any child under sixteen years of age. . . who has not proper
parental care or guardianship."25 The case involved a twelve-
year old boy whose arthritis, which had developed after rheu-
matic fever, impaired his movements. His mother refused to
consult regular physicians, relying solely on home remedies
and faith healing.26
The court found the child neglected, stating that
16. Id. at 705, 126 P.2d at 780.
17. Id. at 712-13, 126 P.2d at 783.
18. When the court decides that medical care is necessary, that state is obli-
gated to pay for treatment where the parents are unable to afford it. In most of the
reported cases, the cost of the treatment was not in question.
19. 13 Wash. 2d at 721, 126 P.2d at 787.
20. Id. at 722, 126 P.2d at 787.
21. 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553 (1952).
22. 'Id. at 295-96, 248 P.2d at 554.
23. Id. at 296, 248 P.2d at 554.
24. 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
25. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2330 (Vernon 1971) current version at TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
26. 205 S.W.2d at 814-15.
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medicines and medical treatment are in the same category as
food, clothing, lodging, and education. The court held that
these are necessities which the parent is legally responsible for
providing under the statute.27
Both Texas and Washington have since revised their
child neglect statutes. The Washington law now defines negli-
gent treatment or maltreatment as "an act or omission which
evidences a serious disregard of consequences of such magni-
tude as to constitute a clear and present danger to the child's
health, welfare, and safety." 8 The Texas statute imposes
upon parents "the duty to support the child, including provid-
ing the child with clothing, food, shelter, medical care, and
education."' Other statutes contain similar specific references
to medical and surgical care,80 and it now seems generally ac-
knowledged that "necessities" of life include medical care and
27. Id. at 813-14.
28. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020 (West Supp. 1982).
29. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.04(3) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
30. CAL. WLF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1981) reads in pertinent part:
Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the fol-
lowing descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which
may adjudge such person to be a dependent child of the court:
(b) Who is destitute, or who is not provided with the necessities of
life....
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 369 (West Supp. 1981) reads in pertinent part:
(a) Whenever any person is taken into temporary custody under the
provisions of Article 7 (commencing with Section 305) of this chapter
and is in need of medical, surgical, dental, or other remedial care, the
probation officer may . . . authorize the performance of such . . . care.
The probation officer shall notify the parent. . . of the care found to be
needed before such care is provided, and if the parent. . . objects, such
care shall be given only upon order of the court in the exercise of its
discretion.
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1012(f)(i)(A) (McKinney 1975) reads:
'Neglected child' means a child less than eighteen years of age
(i) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or
is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of
his parent or other person legally responsible for his care to exercise a
minimum degree of care
(A) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or edu-
cation in accordance with provisions of part one of article sixty-five of
the education law, or medical, dental, optometrical or surgical care,
though financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable
means to do so. . ..
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attention.
2. Court interpretation when specific language is
present
When there is specific language in the statute imposing a
duty upon parents to provide their children with medical or
surgical care, courts have expressed a willingness to include
the furnishing of non-emergency medical treatment in that
duty. The In re Vasko8' case involved such a statute. The
statute defined a neglected child as
one whose parent, guardian, or custodian neglects, or ref-
uses, when able to do so, to provide necessary medical,
surgical, institutional, or hospital care for such child....
Whenever a child within the jurisdiction of the court and
under the provisions of this act appears to the court to be
in need of medical or surgical care . . . a suitable order
may be made for the treatment. . . of such child in its
home, a hospital or other suitable institution.2
The Vasko case involved a two-year old girl who suffered
from glicoma of the retina which left her permanently blind in
her left eye. Due to its malignancy, physicians recommended
removal of the eye. There were no findings, however, as to the
urgency of the operation. There was an excellent chance the
child would live through the operation and a fifty percent
chance the child would be cured. However, the child's parents
arbitrarily refused to consent to surgery.88
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, found
the child neglected under the statute." In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Kapper stated that the statute vests power in the
courts to see to it that "minor children are furnished with
necessary medical attendance which is refused by the par-
ent."35 The court assserted that it may intervene to protect
the health and physical well-being of a child whether or not
that child's life is at stake.86
In the absence of specific statutory language imposing
31. 238 A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933).
32. 1922 N.Y. Laws, ch. 547, art. I § 2(4), art. III § 23, as amended by 1930 N.Y.
Laws, ch. 393, art. I § 2(4), art. III § 24.
33. 238 A.D. at 130-31, 263 N.Y.S. at 555.
34. Id. at 131, 263 N.Y.S. at 556.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 129, 263 N.Y.S. at 554.
19821 477
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upon parents a duty to provide their children with medical
care, early courts split over whether parents were under any
such duty. With the revision of child neglect statutes to insert
specific language and with the awareness that medical care is
necessary for the proper upbringing of the child, courts are
more willing to acknowledge that parents have a duty to pro-
vide their children with non-emergency medical treatment.
B. Considering the Consent or Cooperation of the Child
Though it is now recognized that parental failure to pro-
vide children with non-emergency medical care may, in some
instances, constitute neglect, courts have considered the
child's consent or acquiescence in parental decisions when de-
termining whether to order a specific treatment.
In In re Seiferth,3 7 the New York Court of Appeals con-
sidered the acquiescence of the child an important factor in
its decision. The case involved a fourteen-year old boy, Mar-
tin, who was afflicted with a massive harelip and cleft palate.
His father refused to consent to corrective surgery, and the
Deputy Commissioner of the county health department peti-
tioned the Children's Court to transfer custody from the fa-
ther to the Commissioner for the purposes of administering
the needed medical, surgical, and dental services.38
In dismissing the petition, the court stated that if the
proceeding had been instituted before the child had acquired
convictions of his own, surgery would have been granted with-
out hesitation. But Martin had been schooled by his father in
a philosophy based on the "existence of forces in the uni-
verse," and he had chosen to attempt to heal the cleft palate
and harelip through these natural forces." The court reasoned
that because the child had developed a "sincere and fright-
ened antagonism" toward plastic surgery, less would be lost
by allowing him to reach an age when he could make his own
decision than would be gained by compelling him to undergo
the treatment. This was especially true because he had ex-
pressed an unwillingness to cooperate in postoperative
rehabilitation. 0
37. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
38. Id. at 82, 127 N.E.2d at 821.
39. Id. at 84, 127 N.E.2d at 822.
40. Id. at 85, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
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The dissent vigorously objected to the majority's reason-
ing. It argued that the boy's refusal to consent and failure to
cooperate should not be determinative of the real issue in the
case: whether the child's chances of leading a normal, happy
life were endangered.4 1 "Every child has a right, so far as is
possible, to lead a normal life,"42 the dissent asserted, and it
urged that the boy's refusal to agree not be permitted to ruin
his chance for "a normal, happy existence." ' s
Furthermore, the dissent reminded the majority that this
proceeding had been brought to determine whether the par-
ents, by refusing to provide the necessary medical and dental
care, were neglectful. The dissent argued that the child's con-
sent to his parents' decision, or his passive willingness to let
them act as they choose, should not be determinative of
whether they were guilty of neglect: the child's acquiescence
cannot render his parents' conduct permissible.4 4
In deciding whether the boy was neglected, the court ar-
guably deferred too much to his expressed preferences. How-
ever, consideration of this factor is sound analysis, and, as will
be discussed further, is used by other courts in arriving at
their decision.4
C. Considering the Future Harm to the Child
Courts have also considered the future harm, psychologi-
cal as well as physical, that may occur if parents refuse to fur-
nish their child with non-emergency medical care.
In a case arising under a New York statute," In re
Rotkowitz,47 the Domestic Relations Court found that a ten-
year old child was neglected. The child's father had refused to
consent to an operation designed to correct and prevent fur-
ther aggravation of a leg deformity induced by poliomyelitis.
The petition had been brought by the child's mother.48
In ordering the surgery, the court recognized that failure
to operate would result in not only physical harm, but emo-
41. Id. at 86, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 87, 127 N.E.2d at 824.
44. Id. at 88, 127 N.E.2d at 824.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 68, 69, 81, 82.
46. NEW YORK, N.Y., DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT AcT ch. 482, § 85 (1933).
47. 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941).
48. Id. at 948, 952, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
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tional and psychological harm as well. The court reasoned
that a child progressively deprived of the use of one of his
limbs may feel different from others in the group in which he.
interacts. He may feel rejected, unable to take his proper
place in that group. To the extent that medical science could
correct the deformity or the limitation on the use of the limb,
the court found that that service should be provided.4 '
In another New York decision, In re Sampson," the court
ordered Kevin Sampson, age 15, to undergo treatment of a fa-
cial deformity"' over the objection of his mother. The testi-
mony of doctors showed that the surgery was very risky and
offered no cure. The deformity posed no immediate threat to
the boy's life and had not yet seriously affected his general
health."2 The court emphasized, however, that the deformity
was so disfiguring that "it must inevitably exert a most nega-
tive effect upon his personality development, his opportunity
for education and later employment and upon every phase of
his relationship with his peers and others. '5' Though the boy
was in no physical danger, he risked psychological and emo-
tional harm if not furnished with the corrective surgery. The
court considered the developmental and psychological factors
stemming from the boy's deformity to be of such importance
that it was willing to order surgery in the face of substantial
surgical risks.s ' "[W]hen one considers the bleak prospect for
this boy's future of the alternative of doing nothing, it is a
risk which. . . must be taken."' 5
Thus, in determining whether to order medical treatment
over the objection of parents, courts have considered the long-
range psychological and emotional effects a failure to provide
the treatment may have on the child. Parental refusal to con-
sent may result in no immediate or noticeable decline in the
49. Id. at 950, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
50. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), affd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323
N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1971), alfd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d
686 (1972).
51. 65 Misc. 2d at 659, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 643. Kevin suffered from extensive
neurofibromatosis. It had manifested itself as a large fold or flap of an overgrowth of
facial tissue which caused the right side of his face to droop in a manner that can
only be described as grotesque and repulsive.
52. Id. at 661, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
53. Id. at 660, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
54. Id. at 672, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
55. Id. at 675, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
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general health and physical well-being of the child, but these
courts recognize that refusal could work harm in the child's
future. They are not willing to permit parental inaction to rob
a child of normal social and psychological development.
III. THE DIRECTION OF RECENT DECISIONS
Recent decisions have provided additional guidelines for
deciding questions of court-ordered non-emergency medical
care. The courts have examined whether the child's best inter-
ests will be served by the proposed treatment or whether fail-
ure to provide treatment will deny the child the opportunity
to live a useful, fulfilled life.
A. California's "Best Interests" Analysis
In deciding whether to order non-emergency medical
treatment, the California Court of Appeal employed an analy-
sis which introduced a number of subjective as well as objec-
tive considerations. The case, In re Phillip B.5 involved a
twelve-year old Down's Syndrome5 7 child who suffered from a
congenital heart defect. Due to the defect, Phillip's heart was
required to work three times harder than a normal heart to
pump blood to his body. Physicians recommended that sur-
gery be performed. Testimony revealed the surgical mortality
rate to be five to ten percent, and because Phillip suffered
from Down's Syndrome, his morbidity rate" was calculated to
be somewhat higher than normal. Without the operation Phil-
lip might live 20 more years, but he would suffer from a pro-
gressive loss of energy and vitality; however, if his defect were
surgically corrected, doctors agreed that Phillip would enjoy
an expansion of his lifespan.59
Phillip's parents refused to consent to the surgery. The
juvenile probation department requested that Phillip be de-
clared a dependent child of the court for the purpose of insur-
56. 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied sub nom.
Bothman v. Warren B., 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
57. Id. at 800 n.2, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50 n.2. Down's Syndrome is a disorder of
the chromosomes which causes the patient to exhibit a distinctively shaped head,
neck, trunk, and abdomen.
58. Id. at 800, 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50, 51 ("morbidity rate" refers to the inci-
dence of post-operative complications).
59. Id. at 800, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
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ing that he receive cardiac surgery2° The court, deferring to
the wishes of the parents, refused to order the surgery." The
court, however, recognized that in deciding whether to order
medical treatment rejected by the parents serveral factors
must be considered.
1. Seriousness of the harm
First, the court examined the seriousness of the harm the
child is suffering or the substantial likelihood that he will suf-
fer serious harm.2 In Phillip's case, the congenital heart con-
dition from which he suffered was serious. If the condition
was left uncorrected, Phillip unquestionably would become se-
verely incapacitated and would probably die prematurely.
The seriousness of the harm, however, is not always easily
determined. For instance, in cases where the child suffers
from a cosmetic defect, eye deficiency, or speech impediment,
physical harm is negligible. The child experiences little or no
pain or discomfort. The serious harm may be psychological or
emotional harm occurring in the child's later life and may be
difficult to measure. The California court did not suggest a
means for determining the seriousness of the harm or the sub-
stantial likelihood that the child would suffer serious harm in
these situations.
2. Evaluation of the treatment by the medical
profession
Second, the court considered the evaluation of the treat-
ment by the medical profession.68 All of Phillip's doctors
agreed that if Phillip's heart defect were to be corrected, sur-
gery would be necessary." If the court had found Phillip ne-
glected, it would have been justified in ordering the surgical
procedure unanimously recommended by the medical
profession.
3. Evaluation of the risks involved
Third, the court evaluated the risks involved in medically
60. Id. at 799, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
61. Id. at 804, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
62. Id. at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 800, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
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treating the child. 5 The physician estimated Phillip's surgical
mortality rate to be five to ten percent with a morbidity rate
somewhat higher. Other expert testimony revealed that cor-
rective surgery created the risk of damage to the nerve that
controlled the heart beat, and that if this occurred, Phillip
would require a pacemaker.6
In calculating the risk involved, the court relied heavily
upon medical opinion. The medical opinion is used by the
court in a highly subjective process of balancing the risk of
the proposed treatment against the potential harm the child
will suffer if denied treatment. As a result, the opinion should
be arrived at through responsible medical procedures that are
objective, reliable, and highly accurate.67
4. The expressed preferences of the child
Fourth, the court stated that the expressed preferences of
the child should be considered." If the child is emancipated,
that is, free from the care, control, and custody of his parents,
parental consent for his medical treatment is unnecessary." If
the child is unemancipated, the court should consider the
desires the child has articulated presently as well as in the
past. Where the child is capable of independent thought and
of making a meaningful choice regarding the proposed treat-
ment, the court should give substantial weight to the child's
preferences.
In Phillip's case, the child was unable to make a meaning-
ful decision regarding his medical care. Thus, the court articu-
lated this important consideration, but did not employ it in
its analysis.
5. The best interests of the child
The final factor underlying these four considerations is
65. Id. at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
66. Id.
67. See Watson, Children, Families, and Courts: Before the Best Interests of
the Child and Parham v. J.R., 66 VA. L. REv. 653 (1980).
68. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
69. See Vaupel v. Bellach, 261 Iowa 376, 154 N.W.2d 149 (1967); Rounds Bros.
v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 956 (1909); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161
(1958). The right of minors to obtain abortions without parental consent is outside
the scope of this comment. See Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On
State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 661-64 (1977); Brown,
The Right of Minors to Medical Treatment, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 289 (1979).
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whether the child's welfare and best interests will be served
by the proposed medical treatment.7 This "best interests"
approach is comprehensive for it encompasses the subjective
and objective considerations of the first four factors. Further-
more, it preserves the presumption in favor of parental auton-
omy for it requires the state to show that in light of the
child's and any expert's testimony and in view of the risks in-
volved, the treatment proposed by the state is in the best in-
terests of the child. This approach enables the court to readily
evaluate whether the child is being harmed by the failure or
refusal of the parents to furnish medical care and to deter-
mine whether the benefits of the treatment proposed by the
state outweigh the detriments of state intervention on the in-
tegrity of the family.
B. New York's Useful, Fulfilled Life Approach
The court in In re Phillip B. was faced with the subtle
issue of whether to prolong a life that by ordinary standards
was neither happy nor productive. The Bronx County Su-
preme Court, Special Term, in Application of Frank T. Cic-
ero71 suggested that the value of a handicapped life cannot be
measured by ordinary standards.
The Cicero case involved a child, Lena Vataj, who was
born with Meningomyelocele, a spinal disorder. Treatment of
the disorder was recommended within 48 hours of birth.
Without treatment, her likelihood of survival beyond the age
of six months was poor. With treatment, the impairment of
the legs that normally accompanies this disfunction could be
kept to below the ankles. If successfully treated, the risk of
hydrocephalus, a brain disorder, could be avoided and the
chances of retardation substantially reduced. Lena would be
able to walk with short leg braces and have a "normal" intel-
lectual development. 72
Initially, the parents consented to the operation. Later,
however, they withdrew their consent and insisted on taking
the girl home. Their attitude was to "let God decide" if the
child was to live or die.73
70. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
71. 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979).
72. Id. at 700-01, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 966-67.
73. Id. at 700, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
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The court found the child neglected under the applicable
statute.74 The opportunity to have the surgery performed by
competent physicians was available, irrespective of the par-
ents' financial means.7' Where Lena had a reasonable oppor-
tunity through surgery to grow and surmount the congenital
handicaps, the court stated that it would not hesitate to grant
her that opportunity.7' It reasoned that she had "a reasonable
chance to live a useful, fulfilled life"77 and held that parental
inaction should not be allowed to deny her that chance. 8
The court recognized that even if surgery were completely
successful, Lena would enjoy a less than normal life. The
court, however, rejected the notion that it was preserving a
"hopeless" life. 7' The evidence showed that modern medicine
could ameliorate many of the problems from which Lena
would suffer.8 Despite her reduced existence, she could still
enjoy a "useful, fulfilled life."
The court did not define a "useful, fulfilled life." It only
suggested that non-emergency medical treatment could be or-
dered by the court even though it would not substantially im-
prove a child's level of existence. A child's best interests can
be served by ordering treatment which prolongs his reduced
state of existence.
IV. RECOMMENDED ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINING WHEN THE
COURT SHOULD ORDER NON-EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT
An approach to deciding whether to order non-emergency
medical treatment over the objections of parents should in-
clude consideration of both subjective and objective factors.
A. Preferences of the Child
Where possible, the court should solicit the preferences of
the child. This can be of considerable help to a judge who is
faced with the dilemma of deciding between the competing in-
terests of the parents and the state. A child in early adoles-
74. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1012(f)(i)(A), supra note 30.
75. 101 Misc. 2d at 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
76. Id. at 701, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
77. Id. at 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 701, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
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cence has developed a significant mental capacity, and by his
early teen years, is capable of reasonably mature thought.8"
To the extent that the child is of sufficient age, mental capac-
ity and independence, the court should afford appropriate
weight to his expressed preference.
At times, however, the emotional bond between parent
and child is so strong that parental wishes are faithfully
echoed by the child.82 When it appears that this is the case,
the court is justified in disregarding the child's preferences
and objectively determining what the child would have pre-
ferred were he able to express his desires independently.
B. Solicit Expert Testimony
The court should also solicit expert testimony regarding
the best interests of the child. The judge is not in a position
to know the physical, psychological, or sociological effects a
particular treatment or failure to provide a particular treat-
ment will have on the child's welfare, immediate or future.
The testimony of doctors, psychologists, and psychiatrists can
assist him in rendering sound, well-reasoned, and informed
decisions. Furthermore, requiring the state to present evi-
dence supporting its position that the proposed treatment is
in the best interests of the child preserves the presumption in
favor of parental autonomy.
At times, however, the medical opinion of the state differs
from the medical opinion solicited by the child's parents.83
When this occurs, the court must be cautious in ordering the
child to undergo treatment proposed by the state and rejected
by the parents. If the parents have based their decision as to
appropriate medical treatment upon the recommendations of
a licensed physician practicing competent clinical and diag-
nostic judgment, they have a right to rely on that physician's
recommendations.8 Unless the medical profession is united in
81. See Elkind, Egocentrism in Adolescence, 38 CHILD DEV. 1025, 1032 (1967).
82. E.g., In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 84, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1955).
83. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978); In re Hofbrauer, 47
N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (1979); See Note, Of Love and Laetrile: Medical Deci-
sion Making in a Child's Best Interests, 5 AM. J. L. AND MED. 271 (1979).
84. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 199 (1973). The United States Supreme
Court recognized that a state, in conferrring a license on a physician, holds that phy-
sician out to the public as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. Thus,
parents are justified in relying on a physician's recommendations and competency
because the state has already recognized his or her qualifications. See also Note, In re
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rejection of the treatment proposed by the parents or the phy-
sician chosen by the parents, the court is not justified in or-
dering the child to undergo the treatment requested by the
state.85
C. Whether the Harm is Severe or Irreversible
Once testimony is received from both experts and, where
possible, the child, the court should order the treatment when
it can be shown that failure to provide it would work severe
and irreversible harm to the child. The severity of the harm
may be measured both by the injury the child has suffered
and by the likelihood that the child will suffer harm in the
future. For instance, in In re Sampson,6 Kevin Sampson
failed to show any outstanding personality aberration, but his
deformity was so disfiguring that he had been expelled from
school because he was "grotesque and repulsive" to his teach-
ers.87 The court could not find that Kevin "[had] been or
[would] continue to be wholly unaffected by his misfortune,"
thus, it ordered surgery. 88
Parents are not always in the best position to estimate
the severity of harm a physical deformity may have on the
child. Through ignorance or lack of concern, parents may un-
derestimate or fail to recognize the emotional and psychologi-
cal scars that result from being "different." When this occurs,
the court should intervene to protect the child's well-being.
The court should also order treatment when the harm
may be irreversible. If, in delaying treatment until the child is
emancipated or capable of making an independent decision,
parental inaction makes medical attention either ineffective or
totally useless, the treatment should be ordered. As stated by
the United States Supreme Court, the "state has a legitimate
interest . . . [in preparing its children] for the lifestyle that
they may later choose, or at least to provide them with an
Hofbrauer: May Parents Choose Unorthodox Medical Care for Their Children?, 44
ALB. L. REV. 818 (1980).
85. See In re Hofbrauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 656, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014, 419
N.Y.S.2d 936, 941 (1979).
86. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), afl'd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323
N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1971), afl'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d
686 (N.Y. 1972).
87. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 660, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (1970).
88. Id. According to the court, a psychologist had found Kevin to be extremely
dependent, demonstrating an "inferiority feeling and low self concept."
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option other than the life they have led in the past."89 Paren-
tal wishes should be deferred to only so long as the child re-
tains the potential to reverse the decisions of his parents.
D. Balancing the Risk Against the Potential Harm to be
Suffered.
Balancing the risk of the proposed medical treatment
against the potential harm to be suffered by the child is a dif-
ficult task, and the court must retain its objective, neutral
character. The judge must not allow his middle class values to
cloud his judgment as to what treatment is necessary for the
child. The judge must order only that which will serve the in-
terests of the child.
V. WHY MORE PETITIONS FOR COURT-ORDERED TREATMENT
ARE NOT BROUGHT
Few petitions for court-ordered non-emergency medical
treatment are brought because the concerned individuals are
either unaware of the child's needs or refuse to press the mat-
ter for a hearing.
A. The Medical Profession
Many parents place a low priority on all medical treat-
ment not designed to relieve a recognizable and immediate
physical injury. Thus, the medical profession does not become
acquainted with the child's problem until it reaches emer-
gency or near emergency stages. At that time, parents are
more willing to consent to the necessary treatment. As a re-
sult, there are few non-emergency cases for the physician to
pass on to the appropriate state agency for legal action.
B. School Nurses and Teachers
School nurses and teachers are also concerned for the
health and welfare of the child. There are some physical de-
fects, however, such as eye deficiencies and hearing impair-
ments where the need for correction is difficult for a teacher
to recognize. Thus, the child's condition may not be made
known to the nurse or public health official of the school
89. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 240 (1972).
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district.
School nurses, to the extent they are employed, are, by
virtue of their training, in a position to spot situations in
which the child needs non-emergency medical attention. How-
ever, school nurses endeavor to maintain a rapport with the
parents, which may prevent them from reporting cases to the
authorities in all but the most serious situations.
C. Relatives and Spouses
Relatives and spouses provide another group of concerned
individuals, and have the most direct contact with the child in
need. However, bringing an action of this nature strains famil-
ial relationships and the emotional cost to the concerned rela-
tive may outweigh the benefit gained.
In this sensitive area of family relationships people are
reluctant to intrude and press for a hearing on the matter.
The action seems speculative, the potential benefits difficult
to measure, and the presumption of parental autonomy too
great.
VI. CONCLUSION
Questions of proper child-rearing practices are highly sen-
sitive and emotionally charged. Parents differ in the kind and
quality of medical care they provide for their children, and
they resent authoritarian prescription of any particular treat-
ment. Courts face great difficulty in resolving these disputes
over proper parental conduct, for in many cases there is no
"right" or "wrong" answer. There are, however, guidelines for
the court to follow which can provide assistance.
Testimony taken from the child and the medical profes-
sion regarding the desirability of the treatment, its risks, and
its severity and possible irreversibility is necessary in choosing
the method of care that will best serve the child's interests.
Also, the long-term effects that may result if the child is de-
nied treatment should be carefully considered. Together,
these factors can assist the judge in determining when the
state has overcome the presumption in favor of parental au-
tonomy in family relationships.
The interests parents have in rearing their children as
they think best is not minimized by this approach. This ap-
proach, however, does provide a means whereby the court can
1982]
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determine when to order necessary non-emergency medical
care. Parents are entrusted with a solemn responsibility to
prepare their children to assume useful, well-adjusted roles in
adulthood. When parents fail in their natural function, the
court must act to assure the child the best available opportu-
nity to fulfill his potential in society.
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